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Introduction

The Problem

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Problem

It is NOT clear which execution environments have effective mitigations and can securely be used to implement security critical code, and which do not

Our Contributions

We systematically analyse the security (with respect to Spectre) of programming languages and their execution environments

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- We introduce Speconnector

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- We introduce Speconnector
 - It is a novel tool
 - It is to evaluate and exploit Spectre gadgets
 - It works independent of the target programming language
- We demonstrate the security impact with two case studies of security-related libraries, and show that we can leak secrets from them.

Background

Background

Presentation at the 8th International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy (ICISSP2022)

Background

Speculative Execution

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 Programs run conditional branching hence CPUs often do not have a way to choose the next instruction to execute

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- With speculative execution, the CPU holds the current state, predict the more probable path based on the history of similar events and speculatively executes in the predicted direction

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- If the prediction is not correct the CPU rolls back the architectural state

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- With speculative execution, the CPU holds the current state, predict the more probable path based on the history of similar events and speculatively executes in the predicted direction
- If the prediction is not correct the CPU rolls back the architectural state
- HOWEVER, the microarchitectural state is not reverted

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Transient-Execution Attacks

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 Since the microarchitectural state is not reverted the effects of transient instructions can be reconstructed on the architectural level

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Transient-Execution Attacks

Transient-Execution Attacks

- Since the microarchitectural state is not reverted the effects of transient instructions can be reconstructed on the architectural level
- Attacks of this type traditionally use side-channel attacks to reconstruct the architectural state

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Background

– Gadgets

Gadgets

Definition

A gadget is a piece of code used to transfer the secret information from the victim's side into a covert channel from which the attacker can then retrieve it

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Example

```
if(x < length_of_data){
  tmp &= lookup_table[data[x] << 12];
}</pre>
```

Background

Program Executior

Program Execution

 We categorize the execution environments into three categories based on the program execution

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Interpreted Program Execution

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Note!

This distinction is orthogonal to programming language choice since every language can be interpreted, compiled, and executed in hybrids.

Background

Program Executior

Interpreted Program Execution

Interpreted languages need to be translated every time they are being run

Background

Program Executior

Interpreted Program Execution


- Interpreted languages need to be translated every time they are being run
 - Therefore they are more portable as only the interpreter is platform specific

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Compiled Program Execution

Compiled languages only incur the overhead of translating the code once

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
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
 The aim is to combine the advantages of compiled and interpreted languages

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Program Executior

Managed Program Execution

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
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Background

Program Executior



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Feasibility of Attacks in Documentations

Feasibility of Attacks in Documentations

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- Feasibility of Attacks in Documentations
 - Interpreted Languages

Feasibility of Attacks in Documentations

—Interpreted Languages

Interpreted Languages

We studied 9 different interpreters

Feasibility of Attacks in Documentations

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- We looked into the publicly available documentation of each case

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PLs Attack	RUDY	PHP	shell Bash	Peti	Powerspei	7591	1,112	Vill SCLIPT	FILACS LisP					
Spectre-PHT	Х	Х	Х	\boxtimes	Х	×	Х	Х	Х					
Spectre-BTB	\times	\times	×	\boxtimes	X	\times	\times	×	\times					
Spectre-RSB	X	X	X	\bowtie	X	\times	X	X	X					
Spectre-STL	\times	\times	×	\boxtimes	X	\times	\times	×	×					

- Feasibility of Attacks in Documentations
 - Compiled Languages

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We considered 15 different compilers in our study

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PLs Attack	60	C* [*] CC	C**	C** (Intel	C** (LLVA	^د رون	୍ ଏହି	C (Intel	C (TTAN)	BUSCLINN	Safet MAN	St.	Opject M	Hasker	ocani aniop
Spectre-PHT	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	×	Ø	×	\boxtimes
Spectre-BTB	Ø	Ø	\boxtimes	Ø	Ø	Ø	\boxtimes	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	×	Ø	×	\boxtimes
Spectre-RSB	Ø	Ø	\boxtimes	\boxtimes	\times	Ø	\boxtimes	\boxtimes	×	×	×	×	×	\times	\boxtimes
Spectre-STL	\boxtimes	×	Ø	\boxtimes	×	×	Ø	\boxtimes	×	×	×	×	×	×	\boxtimes

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- Feasibility of Attacks in Documentations
 - └─ Managed Languages

Feasibility of Attacks in Documentations

— Managed Languages

Managed Languages

 We analysed 13 different programming languages and their 18 respective hybrid compilers Feasibility of Attacks in Documentations

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PLs Attack	Dart	Java Orac	Jeil Java open	DR Java Cre	alven lavasci	IPt Dikey) Isvascri	Pt JavaSol	ipt Types	coffee	Pychon Pychon	scala	\$	\$11×17	clojut	e Python	non draminorati	Lelocaniro	> Groovi
Spectre-PHT	×	×	\boxtimes	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	×	×	\boxtimes	\boxtimes	\boxtimes	\boxtimes	×	×	\boxtimes	\boxtimes	\boxtimes
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Spectre-STL	×	×	\boxtimes	\times	×	\boxtimes	\times	×	×	\boxtimes	\boxtimes	\boxtimes	\boxtimes	×	×	\boxtimes	\boxtimes	\boxtimes

Speconnector

Speconnector

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- Speconnector



- -Speconnector
 - —Threat Model

Regular Spectre attack threat model

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Note!

Note that this shows that an attack is possible, and crafting a concrete end-to-end exploit for each language only requires further engineering steps

Speconnector

L_Method

Method

- Speconnector
 - └─ Method

Method

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- Speconnector establishes shared memory between the two processes
- Any victim accesses to one of the now shared pages results in a cache hit and Speconnector catches it by performing *Flush* + *Reload*

Feasibility of Attacks in Practice

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Feasibility of Attacks in Practice

Interpreted Languages

Interpreted Languages

Interpreted Languages

We were able to exploit one interpreter

Feasibility of Attacks in Practice

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Perl

Feasibility of Attacks in Practice

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Feasibility of Attacks in Practice

—Compiled Languages

Compiled Languages

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 We were able to establish a covert channel in 14 out of 15 compilers

Compiled Languages


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Feasibility of Attacks in Practice

— Managed Languages

Managed Languages

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We were able to demonstrate a functioning covert channel in 100% of managed languages

Feasibility of Attacks in Practice

Managed Languages

Managed Languages

- We were able to demonstrate a functioning covert channel in 100% of managed languages
- We introduced attacks for compilers that were so far not known to be vulnerable, i.e., no Spectre attack on these has been demonstrated before

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Feasibility of Attacks in Practice

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PLs Attack	Dart	Java (OracleJDK)	Java (OpenJDK)	Java (GraalVM)	JavaScript (SpiderMonkey)	JavaScript (V8)	JavaScript (Chakra)	TypeScript	CoffeeScript	Python (PyPy)	#5	Scala	Elixir	Clojure	Python (CPython)	OCaml (ocamlc/ocamlrun	Kotlin	Groovy
Depends on setting	-	-	-	*	*	*	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Covert Channel	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Spectre Attack	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	×	\checkmark	\checkmark	×	×	×	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

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Case Studies

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Case Studies

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Note!

Both case studies are using the vulnerable programming languages demonsterated in Section Feasibility of Attacks in Practice of this presentation

Conclusion

Conclusion

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Conclusion

 We did a systematic analysis of different programming languages and their respective compilers/interpreters against Spectre

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- We analysed them in theory and practice

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- We analysed them in theory and practice
- We introduced Speconnector
- We showed Spectre attacks in 8 programming languages not investigated so far and not known to be vulnerable
- We illustrated the security impact of our results using two case studies

Thank you for your attention

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